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I INTRODUCTION 
"The case law as to the duties and liabilities of a statutory body to members of the 
public is in a state of lamentable obscurity and confusion". So said PP Craig in 1978, 1 
quoting what MacKinnon LJ had said in 1940.2 One would have expected the confusion 
to have been resolved before the advent of the next millennium. Instead, it has been 
compounded. 
Principally responsible, perhaps, is Parliament. Having decided that the Crown should 
no longer be immune from suit, it simply waived sovereign immunity completely.3 It 
further assigned governmental functions to statutory bodies, which it subjected to tort 
liability. 4 The statutes which effected these changes made no provision for the differences 
between the government5 and private individuals. Nor did they address the potential for 
the expansion of tort liability which existed following M'Alister (or Donoghue) v 
Stevenson. 6 The question of whether rules limiting the government's liability in tort were 
to be developed was left entirely to the courts. 
This paper addresses the result of the courts' struggle to provide an answer with 
respect to category C in Lord Browne-Wilkinson's schema of governmental liability in X 
(Minors) v Bedforshire County Council. 7 It does not address liability for breach of a 
statutory duty in the absence of a common law duty of care nor the question of when the 
1 PP Craig "Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory Power" [ 1978] LQR 428. 
2 East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Boardv Kent [1940] l KB 319, 332. 
3 In New Zealand tort actions against the Crown first became possible under ss 26, 27 and 37 of The Crown 
Redress Act 1881. Such actions were, however, confined to damage caused by public works, which were 
defined bys 37(3) as such things as railways, roads and bridges. The 1881 Act was repealed and replaced 
by the Crown Suits Act 1908. Section 25 of the 1908 Act together with s 3(c) of the Crown Suits 
Amendment Act 1910 ex'Posed the Crown to liability for all torts. TI1e 1908 Act was in tum replaced by the 
Crown Proceedings Act 1950, s 6(l)(a) of which makes the Crown liable in tort but only where an 
individual in its place would be liable for torts committed by its servants. In England, sovereign immunity 
was not waived until tJ1e passing oftJ1e Crown Proceedings Act 1947. 
4 For exan1ple, tmder s 37L(4) oftJ1e Local Government Act 1974 territorial autllorities are bodies corporate 
and are "capable . . . of suing and being sued". Section 9(2) of tlle Securities Act 1978 makes similar 
provision in respect of tJ1e Securities Conunission. 
5 This tenn will be used to refer to tlle Crown and all agencies tmder its control. 
6 [1932] AC 562. 
7 [1995] 2 AC 633, 730-731. 
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government owes a duty of care not to violate the heads of judicial review. 8 What this 
paper is concerned with is tort claims based on a common law duty of care arising from 
the failure to exercise, or the careless exercise of, a statutory power. Two difficult 
questions have emerged in this area. First, when decisions about whether and how to 
exercise statutory powers made on the basis of social and economic policy should attract 
liability in negligence. Secondly, when the government should be liable for pure 
OITIISSIOnS. 
Only the first is addressed by this paper.9 Part II surveys the attempts by the main 
common law jurisdictions to answer this question . The House of Lords attempted to do so 
in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd10 by conferring immunity from tortious liability 
wherever a statute confers a choice as to how and whether to act unless the choice made 
was unreasonable in the sense in which that word was used in Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbwy Cotporation. 11 This approach extended immunity far 
beyond the policy decisions which require immunity. Mason J for the High Court of 
Australia attempted to address this problem in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman. 12 His 
Honour rejected Dorset Yacht's rule and proposed a rule which immunises only decisions 
which involve the consideration of social policy and resource allocation.13 Unfortunately, 
the other members of the High Court did not agree. Furthermore, the House of Lords in X 
(Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council14 superimposed Mason J's rule upon Dorset 
Yacht's rule. Instead of remedying the problem created by Dorset Yacht their Lordships 
thereby exacerbated it by bolstering the existing immunity. By contrast, the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Just v The Queen in right of British Columbia 15 and Brown v The 
8 
This question was raised in Rowling v Takara Properties lid 119881 I AC 473. 
9 
The second requires a voluminous analysis which is impossible in this paper. 
10
1]9701 AC 1005. 
11 
119481 KB 223, 230. The tenns Wednesbury unreasonableness and irrationality will hencefort11 be used 
interchangeably. The debate about tJ1e exact meaning of Wednesbury unreasonableness is beyo nd tJ1e scope 
of this paper. The term is used as it is employed in the decisions reviewed. 
12 ( 1985) 157 CLR 424. 
13 
Above n 12, 457-458, 469 per Mason J. 
14 
119951 2 AC 633 , 735-739. Five cases were heard together. References to principles common to all live 
cases be to Xv Bedfordshire . The individual cases will be referred to by reference to tJ1e names of the 
parties involved in each (eg tJ1e Newham case) . 
15 (1989) 64 DLR (4111) 689. 
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Queen in right of British Columbia16 developed and improved upon Mason J' s approach 
by choosing a different manner of combining it with Dorset Yacht. New Zealand appears 
to have accepted Mason J' s rule and to have ignored or implicitly rejected Dorset Yacht's 
rule. 
Generally, the courts, and the English courts in particular, have failed to produce rules 
which achieve the aim of avoiding tort liability where it would interfere with 
governmental functions but of permitting it elsewhere. There is a notable absence of 
reasoning in support of some of the rules adopted. And, while most courts purport to 
follow precedent, they frequently depart from previous authorities without making this 
explicit. Confusion has resulted not least because the same concepts have been assigned 
different meanings by different courts. 
A principled reformulation of the rules governing liability is urgently required . The 
law in this important area should be clear. Furthermore, a rule which is intended to 
immunise policy decisions but which extends immunity too far has serious consequences 
for those harmed by government activity. A striking illustration is provided by the 
decision of the English Court of Appeal in Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council. 17 
The defendant council removed the plaintiff from his mother while a child and took him 
into its care pursuant to its statutory powers. He was relocated nine times, he was unable 
to develop a relationship with his family, and his psychiatric illness was not treated. The 
plaintiff sued in negligence, alleging that the defendant carelessly failed to exercise 
various statutory powers, including its power to place him for adoption. Two members of 
the Court applied X v Bedfordshire and struck out his claim on the basis that he could not 
establish Wednesbury unreasonableness. 18 They did so although the decisions of the 
social workers involved raised no questions of government policy. While the House of 
Lords reinstated the plaintiffs action in Barrett on appeal, 19 and although some of their 
16 (1994) 112 DLR (4th) 1. 
17 [1998] QB 367. 
18 Above 17, 375 per Lord Woolf MR, 381 per Schiemann LJ. 
19 [1999] 3 WLR 79. 
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Lordships clearly wished to depart from X v Bedfordshire, Barrett has not provided a 
principled rule. 
If the New Zealand Court of Appeal wishes to discourage the Privy Council from 
imposing the English approach to this part of the law on New Zealand, it will have to 
articulate a clear position of its own and justify its rejection of Dorset Yacht's rule. This 
paper proposes a possible solution. Part III examines the type of rule suggested by Mason 
J in Heyman and the arguments for immunising the government's policy decisions from 
tortious liability. It proposes a policy immunity rule which confers immunity only where 
certain policy matters are actually taken into account by a decision-maker and only where 
a decision is not clearly erroneous.20 It differs from all the tests currently employed by 
the courts in that it creates immunity only to the extent that it is absolutely necessary to 
avoid interference with the functioning of the state. Of all the rules adopted by the 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, the Canadian Supreme Court ' s approach in Brown is the 
closest to the proposed rule. Finally, part IV considers whether Dorset Yacht's rule 
should be retained if the policy immunity rule is adopted . It concludes that Dorset 
Yacht 's should be rejected because it not only extends immunity too far, but also because 
it becomes entirely superfluous once the policy immunity rule is accepted . 
II A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 
A England 
It is settled law that where Parliament authorises the doing of an act, the person who 
does it cannot be sued in tort for any harm which is the inevitable consequence of the 
authorised act. This rule is known as the defence of statutory authority. No express words 
extinguishing tortious liability are required as the defence exists as a matter of presumed 
legislative intention. 21 Of course, questions arise as to when an act is authorised and as to 
when a consequence is inevitable. 
20 The meaning of this new term of art is explained below: part IIJA 1. 
21 The rationale for the defence is that without it stat11tory authority would become "nugatory" because 
defendants could be prevented from doing what an Act pennits by high damages awards or injunctions: 
Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd 11981] AC 1001, 1017-1018, 1023. 
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The first case which attempted to answer these questions was Geddis v Proprietors of 
Bann Reservoir, 22 where the defendants were empowered by a local Act of Parliament to 
construct a reservoir in order to increase the flow of water through the River Bann for the 
benefit of local industry. The defendants used the River Muddock to channel water into 
the Bann from their reservoir. Silt accumulated in the Muddock due to the defendants 
using it as a channel to the Bann, but they failed to exercise their statutory power to clean 
the Muddock. As a result, the Muddock flooded the plaintiffs farm . The House of Lords 
awarded the Plaintiff damages in negligence. Their Lordships unanimously held that 
negligence cannot be authorised as a matter of presumed legislative intention.23 The 
rationale for this was, presumably, that negligence is always avoidable and thus cannot be 
the inevitable consequence of an authorised act. 24 Thus, as a result of Geddis, any 
negligent conduct in the exercise of a statutory power to do some act could attract 
liability. 
The expansion of the welfare state was accompanied by a massive increase in the 
delegation of policy-making by Parliament to the executive. This required the conferral 
of a vast array of discretionary statutory powers upon the executive. The courts were 
understandably reluctant to condemn the executive's policy choices as negligent, and, 
accordingly, the House of Lords modified the defence of statutory authority in Dorset 
Yacht. Parliament was now presumed to have intended to authorise negligent conduct in 
the exercise of discretionary statutory powers unless the conduct was also Wednesbury 
unreasonable. Thus no duty of care could arise in respect of the exercise of statutory 
powers unless irrationality could be proved. The rationale for this was that the 
government often takes policy into account in exercising its discretionary statutory 
powers and that the courts should not interfere with such policy decisions .25 However, 
since not all discretionary decisions involve policy, Dorset Yacht extended immunity 
22 (1878) 3 App Cas 430. 
23 Above n 22, 445, 452, 455. Their Lordships had previously, although less explicitly, accepted a similar 
principle in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Trustees v Gibbs (1864-1866) 11 HLC 686, 713 . 
24 
HWR Wade and CF Forsyth Administrative Law (7ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) 771. See also 
Dorset Yacht, above n 10, 1066 per Lord Diplock. 
25 Above n 10, 1030-1031 per Lord Reid, 1066-1068 per Lord Diplock. 
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much too far. 26 Oddly, Xv Bedfordshire bolstered the executive's immunity further still, 
and it was not until Barrett that their Lordships exhibited any desire to retreat from 
Dorset Yacht. The reason may be that the until Barrett a worthy plaintiff had never been 
in danger of losing a case because of Dorset Yacht's irrationality requirement. 
The facts of Dorset Yacht were that borstal officers had taken borstal trainees to 
Brownsea Island to aid their rehabilitation. The officers went to sleep instead of 
maintaining a watch as instructed, and the trainees escaped and damaged the plaintiff's 
yacht. Although the issue of whether Geddis' rule applies where the Crown's servants 
have a discretion to act pursuant to a statutory power did not arise for decision because 
the borstal officers simply breached their instructions,27 their Lordships considered the 
issue. Lord Diplock appeared to define discretion as the "right to determine the particular 
means within the limits laid down by the statute by which its purpose can best be 
fulfilled". 28 Lords Reid and Diplock and Viscount Dilhome all considered that where the 
government acts under a discretionary statutory power, the defence of statutory authority 
cannot be defeated by mere negligence.29 Viscount Dilhome required that the public 
authority have acted irrationally, 30 while Lord Reid required irrationality or an 
unreasonable failure to consider whether a statutory power should be exercised. 31 Lord 
Dip lock's "test of legality" is less clear as his Lordship at one point in his speech referred 
generically to the "public law concept of ultra vires"32 but at another went so far as to 
require absence of bona fides . 33 Geddis 's rule was thus restricted to cases in which no 
discretion exists, and, since the borstal officers had exercised no discretion, the Home 
Office could be found to owe a duty of care not to permit borstal trainees to escape 
without irrationality being required .34 
26 Below part IVBl(b). 
27 Above n 10, 1031. Lords Slynn and Hutton make this point in Barrett: Above n 19, 97, 103. 
28 Above n 10, 1067. 
29 This rule is henceforth referred to as Dorset Yacht 's rule . 
30 Above n 10, 1049. 
31 Above n 10, 1031. 
32 Above n 10, 1067. 
33 
Above n 10, 1068. It is submitted that his Lordship used this tem1 as a synonym for the term ultra vires as 
he appeared to use these terms interchangeably. 
34 
Above n 10, 1071. 
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The issue of whether Dorset Yacht's obiter restriction of Geddis was to become law 
arose in Anns v Merton London Borough Council. 35 The plaintiffs sued a local council 
after they suffered loss due to its failure to exercise its statutory power to inspect the 
foundations of their dwellings with due care. The House of Lords refused to strike out the 
plaintiffs' action. Three of their Lordships concurred with Lord Wilberforce, who stated 
that liability could be imposed in relation to discretionary acts only if the "action taken 
was not within the limits of a discretion bona :fide36 exercised". 37 What had been obiter in 
Dorset Yacht thus became the law. 
Lord Wilberforce further introduced the distinction between policy and operational 
decisions into English law.38 At one point in his speech he appeared to accept Lord 
Diplock's definition of discretion: "There may be a discretionary element in [a power' s] 
exercise - discretionary as to the time and manner of inspection, and the techniques to be 
used."39 At another he appeared to equate discretion with policy, saying that " [m]ost, 
indeed probably all, statutes relating to public authorities or public bodies contain in them 
a large area of policy. The courts call this ' discretion"' .40 This latter statement implies 
that policy decisions are the subset of discretionary decisions which relate to subject-
matter which the courts are reluctant to review.4 1 However, it is submitted that Lord 
Wilberforce did not consider the distinction between policy-related subject-matter and 
discretion as defined in Dorset Yacht to be important because of his view that " [m]ost, 
indeed all, statutes relating to public authorities or public bodies contain in them a large 
area of policy" .42 In effect, he assumed that all discretionary decisions should be afforded 
35 [1978] AC 728. 
36 It has been suggested that by using the tenn "bona fide" his Lordship intended to lower the threshold 
governing when the defence of statutory authority has been exceeded: S Kneebone Tort Liability of Public 
Authorities (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1998), 83. This cannot be correct. Lord Wilberforce 
adopted the exl)ression from Lord Diplock 's speech in Dorset Yacht, where it was used as a synonym for 
public law intra vires, and indeed cited Dorset Yacht with approval on this point: above n 35, 757 . 
Moreover, the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of Canada both interpreted Lord Wilberforce as 
adopting the Dorset Yacht test: Xv Bedfordshire, above n 14, 736-737; Brown, above n 16, 11-12. 
37 Above n 35, 755 . 
38 Above n 35, 754. 
39 Above n 35, 755. 
40 Above n 35, 754. 
41 This ambiguity is pointed out by SH Bailey and MJ Bowman "The Policy/Operational Dichotomy - A 
Cuckoo in the Nest" [1986] CLJ 430, 438-439. 
42 Above n 35, 754. 
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immunity as, in almost all cases, they relate to policy.43 On this view of Anns, its rule as 
to the defence of statutory authority is the same as that in Dorset Yacht. 
A significant development occurred in Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd, 44 a decision 
of the Privy Council on appeal from New Zealand arising out of the collapse of Takara 
Properties Ltd after the New Zealand government refused to permit the company to 
borrow overseas. Their Lordships recognised the need for a rule which immunised 
decisions involving policy rather than all discretionary decisions, stating that the 
policy/operations distinction was now simply "expressive of the need to exclude 
altogether those cases in which the decision under attack .. . is unsuitable for judicial 
resolution". 45 Such cases are presumably those in which social policy and resource 
allocation decisions are made. Thus the Privy Council ' s test is essentially the same as that 
adopted by Mason J in Heyman, and marks a significant departure from Anns, in which 
the distinction between policy and operations was equated with that between 
discretionary and non-discretionary acts. Unfortunately, their Lordships did not explain 
the role of Dorset Yacht's rule in the light of the new policy/operations distinction. 
Clarification of Dorset Yacht 's role was provided in Xv Bedfordshire, where local 
councils were sued for carelessly exercising and failing to exercise statutory powers 
which allowed them to remove children from their families and to address students' 
learning disabilities. The case presented their Lordships with the opportunity to 
rationalise the law. Their Lordships could have reinterpreted Anns in the light of Rowling 
v Takara Properhes Ltd to hold that only decisions involving policy - as opposed to all 
discretionary decisions - attract immunity unless they are Wednesbury unreasonable. The 
English law would then have been the same as the law of Canada after Just and Brown. 
Unfortunately, their Lordships refused to depart from Anns and Dorset Yacht and 
43 This view is also taken by B Feldthusen "Failure to Confer Discretionary Public Benefits : TI1e Case for 
Complete Negligence Immunity" [ 1997] TLR 17. 20 . 
44 [1988] l AC 473. 
45 Above n 44, 50 l. References to the policy/operations distinction below are to the distinction as 
formulated here in Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd and not as formulated in Anns. As the 
policy/operations distinction as it existed in Anns was the same as Dorset Yacht 's rule, botl1 the approach in 
Anns and that in Dorset Yacht will henceforth be referred to as Dorset Yacht 's rule. Anns will be 
10 
continued to immunise all discretionary decisions - as opposed to only those involving 
policy - falling short of irrationality. They further refused to acknowledge that the 
policy/operations distinction in Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd and Dorset Yacht's rule 
share the common purpose of immunising policy decisions, that the former is preferable 
to the latter, and that the latter is thus redundant. 46 Instead, their Lordships superimposed 
Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd upon Dorset Yacht 's rule, meaning that where a 
discretionary decision involves policy, not even its irrationality will permit a duty to 
arise. Lord Browne-Wilkinson spoke for a unanimous House of Lords in setting out four 
general principles to this effect. 
First, discretion refers to a decision made "in exercising a statutory [power] as to 
whether or not to do an act" and is to be contrasted with " [when] having decided to do 
[an] act, .. . the manner in which you do it."47 
Secondly, a discretionary decision will be immunised unless it is irrational. Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson expressly rejected the possibility that any of the other heads of 
judicial review could defeat the immunity.48 
Thirdly, where the allocation of finite resources or the balance between competing 
social policy objectives must be taken into account in making a decision, the decision is 
non-justiciable. A finding of irrationality becomes impossible, it therefore becomes 
impossible to decide that the defence of statutory authority does not apply, and no 
common law duty can exist. 49 It is at this third stage that the policy/operations distinction 
in Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd is superimposed on Dorset Yacht . Lord Browne-
Wilkinson found none of the five cases before the House of Lords to be non-justiciable. 
specifically referred to where it is necessary to distinguish Lord Wilberforce 's reasoning from that in 
Dorset Yacht. 
46 Below part IVB. 
47 Above n 14, 735 . 
48 Above n 14, 736-737. 
49 Above n 14, 737-738. 
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Fourthly, if an act is non-discretionary, a duty of care exists if the test for the 
imposition of a duty of care set out in Caparo Industries Pie v Dickman50 is satisfied, 
provided that the imposition of a duty is consistent with the statutory framework. 51 This 
fourth principle implies that Geddis applies to all non-discretionary decisions. Although 
nothing was expressly said to this effect, it would appear that if a discretionary decision is 
justiciable and irrational, liability is similarly to be imposed in accordance with Caparo. 
Having established a schema of liability in X v Bedfordshire, their Lordships 
dismantled it in part in Stovin v Wise, 52 where a council was sued for failing to remove a 
bank which reduced visibility at a dangerous intersection. A majority of the House of 
Lords rejected the policy/operations distinction on the basis that it had produced 
untenable results when applied in Canada.53 However, their Lordships were unanimous in 
requiring irrationality as a precondition to liability. 54 However, Lord Hoffmann's 
reasoning may have been confined to pure omissions cases because he sought to explain 
liability in pure omissions cases by analogy with the test of liability for breach of 
statutory duty in the absence of a common law duty of care. 
Dissatisfaction with Dorset Yacht and Xv Bedfordshire is reflected in the House of 
Lords ' most recent decision in this area in Barrett. In reinstating the plaintiffs claim for 
negligence in the exercise of a discretionary statutory power55 despite the absence of a 
pleading of irrationality, Lord Hutton stated that: 56 
50 [1990] 2 AC 605, 617-618. The three-stage test requires that the damage suffered by the plaintiff be 
reasonably foreseeable, that there be sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and defendant and that it be 
just and reasonable to impose a duty of care. The creation of novel duties is to be informed by precedent. 
51 Above n 14, 739. 
52 [1996] AC 932. 
53 Above n 52, 955-956 . Their Lordships specifically referred to Brown and Just. 
54 Above n 52, 936 per Lord Nicholls, 953 per Lord Hoffmann. 
55 It is not clear whether the plaintiff in fact sued in respect of a specific statutory power as literally 
understood. He may have been suing in respect of the council 's breach of its statutory duties. Their 
Lordships however considered that the council was being sued in respect of "statutory discretions": above n 
19, 82. It thus appears that Dorset Yacht 's rule, which might have been thought to be confined to discretion 
existing under statutory powers, may also apply where there is a wide range of different courses of action 
which can be seen as discharging a broadly framed statutory duty. 
56 Above n 19, 111. 
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where a plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries57 which he alleges have been 
caused by decisions negligently taken in tl1e exercise of a statutory discretion, and 
provided that tlle decisions do not involve policy which tl1e courts are ill-equipped to 
adjudicate upon, it is preferable for the courts to decide the validity of tlle plaintiff's 
claim by applying directly tlle common law concept of negligence tllan by applying as a 
preliminary test the public law concept of Wednesbury Wlfeasonableness .. . to determine 
if tlle decision fell outside tlle ambit of tlle statutory discretion. 
This statement is a clear departure from the principles set out in Xv Bedfordshire, 
where Lord Browne-Wilkinson was emphatic in stating that "nothing which [a public] 
authority does within the ambit of [a] discretion can be actionable at common law". 58 As 
there in no reason to suppose that Lords Hutton and Browne-Wilkinson ascribed different 
meanings to the expression "within the ambit of a discretion", their speeches cannot be 
reconciled. Lord Hutton's suggestion59 that Lord Browne-Wilkinson ' s requirement of 
irrationality was limited to decisions involving non-justiciable policy considerations is, 
with respect, incorrect. For Lord Browne-Wilkinson non-justiciability meant not that 
irrationality was required before a common law duty can be imposed but that "the court 
. . . cannot reach the conclusion that the decision was outside the ambit of the statutory 
discretion" and therefore cannot impose a duty of care.60 
On the view expressed in Lord Hutton's dictum above,6 1 liability may be imposed on 
decision-makers if they breach a common law duty of care while exercising a 
discretionary statutory power without a finding that their conduct was irrational. It 
necessarily follows that Lord Hutton has revived Geddis and rejected Dorset Yacht as the 
test of when what is done under a statutory power falls within the defence of statutory 
authority . Indeed, his Lordship expressly described Dorset Yacht 's rule as obiter.62 
However, Lord Hutton departs from Geddis in that liability is excluded in respect of 
57 There is no reason to suppose tllat his Lordship intended to restrict this principle to personal injury claims 
as opposed to negligence claims based on property damage. It is submitted tllat personal injury was referred 
to merely because tl1e plaintiff's claim was in respect of personal injury. 
58 Above n 14, 738. 
59 Above n 19, 109. 
60 Above n 14, 738. 
61 Above n 19, 111. 
62 Above n 19, 103 . 
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policy decisions as in Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd. Finally, his Lordship provided no 
clear guidance as to whether policy decisions have retained the absolute immunity which 
X v Bedfordshire conferred upon them or whether, as in Brown, policy decisions can 
attract liability if they are irrational. 
The only other Law Lord to deliver a full speech was Lord Slynn. Like Lord Hutton, 
his Lordship noted that Dorset Yacht's restriction of Geddis was obiter. 63 For his 
Lordship, the likelihood of a decision being found to be non-justiciable increases with 
both the degree of discretion conferred and the degree to which competing policy 
considerations must be weighed. His Lordship further stated that "acts done pursuant to 
the lawful exercise of [a] discretion can . .. be subject to a duty of care, even if some 
element of discretion is involved."64 Thus both Lords Hutton and Slynn departed from the 
principles set out in Xv Bedfordshire. 
Unfortunately, the tests proposed by Lords Hutton and Slynn differ. Furthermore, it is 
possible that Lord Browne-Wilkinson did not intend to depart from Xv Bedfordshire and 
Dorset Yacht. His Lordship simply stated that the plaintiff's claim could not be struck out 
because it was impossible to say that the injury to the plaintiff could not have been 
caused by an operational decision. 65 He probably meant that if findings of fact were made 
it might emerge that the social workers did not in fact exercise any discretion and could 
thus have owed a duty under Xv Bedfordshire without having acted irrationally. If this 
interpretation of Lord Browne-Wilkinson's speech is correct, then because Lords Nolan 
and Steyn both expressed agreement with the speeches of all three of the other Law 
Lords,66 no definite rule emerges from Barrett. Whether Dorset Yacht still applies or 
whether Geddis has been reinstated except in respect of policy decisions is thus unclear in 
England. 
63 Above n 19, 97. 
64 Above 11 19, 97. 
65 Above 11 19, 82-83. 
66 Above n 19, 100. 
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B Canada - Dorset Yacht adapted 
The Supreme Court of Canada initially adopted Dorset Yacht's rule by adopting 
Anns. However, when it later had occasion to review Anns, it rejected Dorset Yacht. 
Instead of superimposing Mason J's rule in Heyman upon Dorset Yacht 's rule as the 
House of Lords did in Xv Bedfordshire, the Supreme Court in Just fused the two in the 
reverse order. This, it is respectfully submitted, took the Court very close to the correct 
approach. 
Anns was adopted in City of Kam/oops v Nielsen, 67 where the city had a statutory duty 
to enforce a by-law which required the foundations of new buildings to meet certain 
standards, but a discretion as to how it enforced the by-law. Possibly because the by-
law' s enforcement would have been contrary to the interests of one of the city ' s 
aldermen, it failed even to consider whether it should be enforced against the builder of 
the plaintiffs house. Adopting Anns, 68 the Supreme Court found the city liable. For the 
majority, Wilson J found that a duty existed and that the city had exceeded its discretion 
as to how to enforce the by-law because "inaction for no reason or inaction for an 
improper reason cannot be a policy decision taken in the bona Ji.de exercise of 
discretion."69 The Supreme Court thus accepted Dorset Yacht 's rule and rejected Geddis. 
Just marks the Supreme Court's point of departure from the English authorities. The 
plaintiff sued the government of British Columbia in respect of its exercise of its statutory 
power to inspect the slopes above a road for loose rocks because a rock had struck his 
car. Writing for the majority, Cory J stated that ordinary common law principles were to 
determine liability and that special rules were to exist only in relation to "pure policy 
decisions". 70 Quoting Mason J in Heyman, Cory J defined policy decisions as those 
"dictated by financial , economic, social or political factors". 7 1 Cory J thus departed from 
the sense in which the term policy was used in Anns and Nielsen, where it was 
67 (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 461. 
68 Above n 67, 663. 
69 Above n 67, 673. 
70 Above n 15, 708-709. 
71 Above n 15, 705-706, citing Heyman, above n 12, 469. 
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synonymous with discretion as defined in Dorset Yacht. Policy decisions now appear to 
be the subset of discretionary decisions which actually involve the consideration of 
policy. 
Cory J then fused Dorset Yacht's and Mason J's rules. However, his approach is 
radically different from that in X v Bedfordshire . His Honour stated that "a policy 
decision is open to challenge on the basis that it is not made in the bona fide exercise of 
discretion". 72 Thus, whereas in Xv Bedfordshire their Lordships retained Dorset Yacht 's 
rule and used Mason J's rule to create absolute immunity for discretionary decisions 
which involve policy, Cory J used Mason J's rule to confer immunity only on decisions 
which involve policy and not all discretionary decisions. Then he used Wednesbmy 
unreasonableness to deny immunity to those decisions which involve policy but which 
are so inappropriate that they should nevertheless attract liability. 
However, while repeatedly stating that the "bona fide exercise of discretion" 
precludes liability for policy decisions,73 at one point in his judgment his Honour required 
that the system of inspection chosen as the result of the bona fide exercise of a discretion 
"be a reasonable one in all the circumstances". 74 At yet another he required " the 
reasonable exercise of a bona fide discretion based, for example, upon the availability of 
funds ."75 From this it would appear that a reasonableness requirement of some sort has 
been superimposed upon the Wednesb111y test which has been superimposed upon Mason 
J' s test. 
This superfluous reasonableness requirement was eliminated in Brown, whose facts 
very were very similar to those of Just. Cory J for the majority stated that "a policy 
decision cannot be reviewed on a private law standard of reasonableness". 76 Otherwise, 
Brown affirmed the test in Just, although it clarified that a policy decision can result in 
liability only if " made in bad faith or in circumstances where it was so unreasonable that 
72 Above 11 15, 708. 
73 Above 11 15, 708 . 
7
~ Above 11 15, 706. 
7
' Above 11 15, 707 . 
16 
it exceeds governmental discretion" .77 Brown was itself recently affirmed in Lewis v 
British Columbia. 78 
C Australia - Dorset Yacht's/ate unclear 
The Justices of the High Court of Australia have found themselves unable to reach 
agreement on their position with respect to Dorset Yacht's rule. In Heyman the High 
Court of Australia unanimously rejected a claim in negligence arising from facts almost 
identical to those in Anns. Gibbs CJ, with whom Wilson J agreed, adopted the principles 
set out in Anns but found that the plaintiff had failed to prove a breach of the alleged duty 
of care. 79 
By contrast, Mason J, using the term "policy" not as a synonym for discretion but to 
refer to "decisions which involve . . . financial , economic, social or political factors or 
constraints", granted the government an absolute immunity from negligence actions in 
respect of policy decisions.80 His Honour unequivocally rejected Dorset Yacht 's rule, 
charging it with extending immunity too far .8 1 
Deane J did not comment on Geddis' rule but stated that a duty would be "precluded 
in cases where what is involved are actions taken in the exercise of policy-making powers 
and functions of a quasi-legislative character". 82 Finally, Brennan J did not comment on 
the policy/operations distinction nor on Dorset Yacht's restriction of Geddis' rule. The 
fate of Geddis and of the policy/operations distinction thus remained open after Heyman. 
The High Court ' s recent decision in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day83 - in which a 
local authority was held liable in negligence for failing to ensure that a defective chimney 
was attended to before it caused fire - has not clarified the Court ' s position . Brennan CJ 
76 Above n 16, 16. 
77 Above n 16, 11-12. 
78 [1997] 3 SCR 1145. 
79 Above n 12, 442. 
80 Above n 12, 469. 
81 Above n 12, 457-458, 468. 
82 Above n 12, 500. 
83 (1998) 192 CLR 330. 
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required irrationality for liability. 84 It appears, however, that his Honour saw himself as 
deriving a right to compensation from the language of the applicable statute or by 
analogy with it. 85 Whether he considered this to have any bearing on Geddis' rule is 
unclear. As in Heyman, his Honour made no reference to the policy/operations 
distinction. 
Both Toohey and McHugh JJ imposed liability without making a finding of 
irrationality, 86 although McHugh J endorsed Brennan CJ's test. 87 Neither made clear his 
position on the policy/operations distinction. 
Finally, Kirby and Gummow JJ both rejected the requirement of irrationality as a 
precondition to liability, and their reasoning, unlike Brennan CJ's, was not confined to 
pure omissions cases. Gummow J considered public law concepts to be completely 
irrelevant in negligence actions, 88 while Kirby J thought it appropriate to impose liability 
on the basis of Caparo 's three-stage test89 and to ignore irrationality.9° Finally, Gummow 
J endorsed Deane J' s formulation of the policy/operations distinction in Heyman, while 
Kirby J endorsed Mason J's.91 
D New Zealand - Dorset Yacht implicitly rejected 
The policy/operations distinction was affirmed as part of the law of New Zealand by 
the Privy Council in Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd. This was, however, obiter,92 and 
the distinction has not been referred in any recent New Zealand decisions . Dorset Yacht's 
rule has been even more unpopular. It has been referred to in only one decision, and 
subsequent decisions have imposed liability without requiring irrationality in 
84 Above n 83, 346-347. 
85 Above n 83 , 347. 
86 Above n 83, 363 per Toohey J, 374 per McHugh J. 
87 Above n 83 , 373. 
88 Above n 83 , 390-391. 
89 Above n 83, 419. 
90 Above n 83 , 426. 
91 Above n 83 , 393-394 per Gummow J, 425-426 per Kirby J. 
92 Above n 44, 500. 
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circumstances m which the English courts would have required it. New Zealand, it 
appears, has implicitly rejected Dorset Yacht's rule and has never departed from Geddis. 
The only decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in which Dorset Yacht's rule 
has been expressly considered to is Takara Properties Ltd (in receivership) v Rowling93 -
a strike out application in the complex of proceedings arising from the collapse of Takaro 
Properties Ltd. The Court's response to Dorset Yacht was ambiguous. Woodhouse J 
appeared to argue that the House of Lords in Dorset Yacht and Anns did not intend to 
formulate a test which would apply in all cases of alleged negligence in the exercise of 
statutory powers. 94 His Honour further stated that Dorset Yacht's rule "could seem on the 
face of it to be potentially unjust for the aggrieved citizen". 95 However, he then accepted 
as "an accurate reflection of the law" a passage from a leading text which simply restated 
Dorset Yacht's rule.96 Richardson J (as he then was) appeared to consider Anns highly 
persuasive97 and merely described Anns ' adoption of Dorset Yacht 's rule without offering 
any comment.98 Richmond P agreed with both Woodhouse and Richardson JJ without 
specifically commenting on Dorset Yacht .99 
In its subsequent decisions, the Court of Appeal, while enthusiastic in its acceptance 
of Anns' two-stage test for imposing a duty of care, 100 has not referred to Anns ' or Dorset 
Yacht's restriction of Geddis' rule. In Mt Albert Borough v Johnson 101 the Court for the 
first time found a council liable in negligence for the subsidence of a building whose 
foundations had been inspected carelessly. Despite the fact that Lord Wilberforce in Anns 
had expressly stated that building inspection involves discretion and that a duty could 
93 [1978] 2 NZLR 314. 
94 Above n 93, 326. 
95 Above n 93, 327. 
96 Above n 93, 327, citing HWR Wade A dministrative Law (4ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977), 628-629. 
97 Above n 93, 332. 
98 Above n 93, 334. 
99 Above n 93, 318. 
100 Above n 35, 751. Lord Wilberforce stated that whether a duty exists can be detennined by answering the 
following two questions: "First ... whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has 
suffered damage there is a sufficient degree of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable 
contemplation of the fonner, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to tl1e latter . .. 
Secondly, ... whetl1er there are considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of 
the duty" . The test was accepted in Brown v Heathcote Co unty Co uncil [1986] l NZLR 77, 79. 
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exist only if irrationality was proved, 102 the Court imposed liability without referring to 
irrationality. It applied the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Dutton v Bognar 
Regis Urban District Council, 103 which predated Anns and in which Dorset Yacht's rule 
had been ignored. The Court has taken the same approach in its most recent decisions on 
building inspection.104 
Recently, the Court of Appeal has decided two cases with facts similar to those of Xv 
Bedfordshire. In A-G v Prince105 the plaintiff, who had been given up by his mother to 
the defendant state agency for adoption, sued the Department of Social Welfare in 
negligence. He alleged that he had suffered psychological injury due to the appalling 
parenting of his adoptive parents and that the defendant failed to prevent his injuries. The 
Court again found that a duty could exist without referring to irrationality, although it 
may not have been directly relevant because the Department was acting under statutory 
duties rather than powers. The same approach was taken in B v Attorney-Generat. 106 
E United States of America 
Unlike the Commonwealth Parliaments, the Congress of the United States did 
anticipate the difficulties which would arise in making the law of negligence into a 
vehicle for governmental liability. The Federal Torts Claims Act of 1946 waived 
sovereign immunity for torts of federal employees. However, s 2680(a) excludes liability 
in tort in relation to : 
[a]ny claim ... based upon the exercise or perfonnance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of 
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 
101 [1979] 2 NZLR 234. 
102 Above n 35, 755 . 
103 [1972] l QB 373. 
104 Jnvercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513 . This decision was affirmed on appeal by the 
Privy Council, again without any reference to Dorset Yacht's rule: Jnvercargi/1 City Council v Hamlin 
[1996] AC 624. See also Fleming v Securities Commission [1995] 2 NZLR 514, a case about involving a 
failure by the Securities Commission to prosecute for breaches of the Securities Act 1978. 
105 [1998] l NZLR 262. 
106 (1999) 17 FRNZ 694. 
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In Dalehite v United States107 the plaintiff was injured when fertiliser owned by the 
government exploded. The plaintiff alleged negligence in the government's decisions not 
to investigate the risk of explosion adequately, to bag the fertiliser at a high temperature, 
to use paper bagging and not to provide a warning. By a majority the Supreme Court of 
the United States found that these decisions all fell within s 2680(a) because they 
involved considerations bearing on the practicability of a cabinet decision to supply 
countries defeated in the Second World War with aid. 10
8 It refused to define discretionary 
functions but said that " [ w ]here there is room for policy judgment and decision there is 
discretion". 109 
Jackson, Black and Frankfurter JJ, dissenting, construed s 2680(a) more narrowly. 
Their Honours argued that the absence of evidence of a conscious decision to balance risk 
against the need for foreign aid meant that the exception did not apply . 110 Any balancing 
of risk against the cost involved was more akin to the decisions routinely made by all 
private manufacturers than governmental policy decisions. 
111 
Discretion was redefined by the Supreme Court in United States v Gaubert, 112 in 
which a shareholder of an investment institution sued the United States' government for 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ' s (FHLBB) management of the institution after 
taking control of it in an attempt to secure its financial position. The Court stated that the 
consideration of social or economic policy was not required for s 2680(a) to apply . 
113 A 
decision must simply be "based on the purposes that the regulatory regime seeks to 
accomplish." 114 Thus, the Supreme Court has created a field of immunity similar to that 
which existed after Dorset Yacht and Anns, except in that s 2680(a) prevents the 
immunity from being defeated even by irrationality. 
101 346 us 15 (1953). 
108 Above n 107 42 
109 Above n 107'. 35~36. 
11 0 Above n 107, 57-58. 
111 Above n 107, 60. 
112 499 us 315 (1991). 
113 Above n 112, 332. 
114 Above n 112,321. 
21 
F Summary 
Given the wide divergence in the approaches taken by the courts, it may be helpful to 
summarise them. 
1 Dorset Yacht, Anns and Nielsen 
Where a decision is made in the exercise of a discretion as to how to achieve a 
statute' s purpose, a duty of care can exist only if irrationality is established . Irrationality 
does not suffice for liability but merely defeats the defence of statutory authority. To 
establish liability, a duty must also arise under ordinary common law principles and have 
been breached. 
2 Xv Bedfordshire 
As for Dorset Yacht, but where a decision 1s non-justiciable and discretionary, 
liability is impossible. 
3 Heyman per Mason J 
Where a decision involves policy, no duty can exist. Otherwise Geddis applies . 
4 Just and Brown per Cory J 
Where a decision involves policy, a duty can exist only if the decision is irrational. 
Otherwise Geddis applies. 
III A POLICY IMMUNITY RULE? 
Cory J's rule in Brown and Mason J's rule in Heyman are considered here. These 
rules assume that different rules of liability are required for the government and private 
individuals because the former makes policy decisions in the public good whereas the 
latter do not. They therefore seek to identify a class of policy decisions and to create 
special rules of liability for this class. They assume that no significant differences exist 
between decisions made by private individuals and government decisions which do not 
involve policy, and conclude that ordinary common law principles suffice for both. 
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Finally, they reject Dorset Yacht's rule; the fact that public authorities may have a 
discretion as to how to further the purposes of a statute is not seen as the basis for 
differential treatment. 
Arguments which have been advanced in support of the creation of special rules of 
liability for the government are considered below. It is submitted that these arguments 
show that differential treatment is necessary. And, in as far as these arguments are valid, 
it is submitted that the policy immunity rule developed below answers them. The rule 
argued for is a modified version of that adopted by Cory Jin Brown. 
Part IV then considers whether, in the light of the policy immunity rule formulated 
below, a special rule for discretionary decisions is still required. 
A Are special rules needed for the government? 
1 Absence of objective standards 
The absence of objective standards by which courts can assess the reasonableness of 
the executive ' s policy decisions is often cited as a reason for denying them the ability to 
hold policy decisions negligent. 115 
It may be difficult to assess the reasonableness of a decision to attempt to rehabilitate 
of borstal trainees by taking them to an island and thereby to increase the risk of harm to 
the public. However, it seems obvious that not all policy decisions defy characterisation 
as negligent. For example, a decision to release all dangerous inmates from prisons so as 
to promote rehabilitation could without difficulty be described as careless. It seems 
absurd to say that an absence of objective standards would hinder a court from being able 
to make such a determination. Thus, while the absence of objective standards means that 
a court should not condemn as unreasonable every policy decision with which it 
disagrees, there are undeniably some policy decisions which can safely be held negligent. 
115 Dorset Yacht, above 11 10, 1031 per Lord Reid; Just, above 11 15, 705 per Cory J, citing Blessing v 
United States 447 FS 1160, 1170. 
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LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
For this reason it is submitted that where the government can prove that it actually took 
policy considerations into account in making a decision as to how to exercise its statutory 
powers, liability should be possible but only if the decision was clearly erroneous. The 
class of decisions falling under the policy immunity rule can, drawing on Mason J's 
comments in Heyman, be defined as including decisions involving resource allocation, 
social policy and political considerations. 11 6 
The proposed threshold of clear erroneousness is similar to the Wednesbury 
unreasonableness threshold. In order to lose immunity, a decision-maker must strike a 
policy balance which no reasonable decision-maker could strike. The courts could adopt 
a subset of the indicia of Wednesbwy unreasonableness set out by de Smith in his 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action117 in determining what is clearly erroneous. 
However, the Wednesbury test cannot simply be adopted for the purposes of the 
policy immunity rule. This is because the heads of judicial review are not mutually 
exclusive. For instance, taking an irrelevant consideration into account or breaching 
natural justice may render a decision irrational. 11 8 Thus, a public authority which, for 
budgetary reasons, decides to inspect only the foundations of houses on right side of a 
street and disregards someone's legitimate expectation of consultation in respect of its 
decision, may be found to have acted irrationally. It is inappropriate to deny immunity in 
these circumstances. Immunity is conferred because of the difficulty which the courts 
experience in determining whether a policy decision is unreasonable in the absence of 
objective standards. Breach of a legitimate expectation says nothing about whether, if 
policy considerations are taken into account, the policy balance struck is unreasonable. 
Therefore immunity should not be denied. Indeed, referring to the argument that 
Wednesbury unreasonableness establishes that a policy decision was made without taking 
11 6 Above n 12, 469-470. 
11 7 SA de Smith, H Woolf and JL Howell Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5ed, Sweet & Maxwell , 
London, 1995) 551-552. 
118 Wheeler v Leicester City Co uncil (1985] l AC 1054, 1079 per Lord Rask.ill . See also de Smith, above n 
117, 551-552. He suggests that breach of a legitimate expectation can a.n1ount to Wednesbury 
unreasonableness. 
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reasonable care, Craig has said that "[l]ogically this need not be so, and it is only by an 
elliptical use of the term 'reasonable' that the step is made." 119 
It is thus submitted that the set of decisions to which immunity should be denied must 
be a subset of irrational decisions. Drawing on de Smith's text, clear erroneousness could 
be established by manifestly inadequate weight being accorded to certain defined relevant 
considerations, illogicality, the drawing unjustifiable distinctions among individuals or 
· 120 oppressiveness. 
Finally, while it may be objected that the clear erroneousness test creates uncertainty 
and is subjective, it is a necessary compromise as the only alternatives are to immunise 
all policy decisions no matter how absurd or to immunise none. 
2 The separation of powers 
According to this argument, it is Parliament's or, when Parliament chooses to 
delegate, the executive' s role to determine what the public good requires and to act 
accordingly. The courts ' role is merely to apply the law as Parliament enacts it, and not to 
usurp the discretionary statutory powers by which Parliament delegates to the executive. 
Dissatisfaction with policy decisions is to be remedied via the ballot box. 121 Judicial 
condemnation of executive action as negligent is therefore said to be inappropriate. 
This argument is not persuasive. First, under a Westminister constitutional system the 
separation of powers is honoured more often in the breach than in the observance. 
Inherent in the common law is a judicial legislative capacity. Furthermore, the proposed 
11 9 Above n 1, 449. It should be noted that where policy has been taken into account, it may be appropriate 
to deny immunity if it can be established 01at the policy decision reached would not have been made had, 
for example, an irrelevant consideration not been taken into account. This is because in such cases it is not 
01e policy decision itself which is being challenged, meaning 01at the courts need not find 01at a policy 
choice was unreasonable. The duty at issue ceases to be a duty not carelessly to do or not do the act which 
ilie statute authorises and becomes a duty to take care not to act ultra vires. 
120 These are some of 01e factors which de Srni01 treats as indicia of Wednesbury mrreasonableness: de 
Smiili, above n 117, 551-552. 
121 J Sopinka "The Liability of Public Authorities: Drawing the Line" [1993] TLR 123, 124 . See also 
Takara Properties Ltd (in receivership) v Rowling, above n 93 , 333 per Richardson J. 
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policy immunity rule would restrict any intrusion by the courts into the policy realm to 
clearly erroneous decisions. 
Secondly, one of Montesquieu ' s primary reasons for propounding his famous theory 
was his desire that the branches of government act as checks on each other. He said that 
"power should be a check to power". l22 To prevent the courts from checking executive 
excesses in the form of violations of individuals ' common law rights on the basis of the 
separation of powers would be self-defeating. Furthermore, it would be to ignore the 
fundamental requirement of the rule of law that the government act within in the law.
123 
Thirdly, the inadequacy of the ballot box as a remedy for administrative matters 
which are not of overwhelming public concern is reflected in the rapid development of 
administrative law this century. 124 It is simply unrealistic to expect the government to fear 
that it will lose an election because of negligent building inspections however grave may 
be the injustice to those affected by them. 
Finally, it is submitted that the argument that the adversarial process is unsuitable for 
evaluating policy decisions125 should be rejected. If current rules of evidence and other 
courtroom procedures are indeed inadequate, then it is open to the courts to modify them. 
3 Inshtutional competence 
Feldthusen has argued that negligence actions, at least in respect of a public 
authority ' s failure to confer a benefit, may result in "astronomical" increases in court 
costs because "[b Ji lateral dispute resolution is an awkward vehicle with which to assess 
public policy". 126 
122 CL Montesquieu L 'esprit des /ois (1748), Book XI, cited in PA Joseph Constitutional and 
A dministrative Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1993) 222. 
123 Joseph above n 122, 222: "As long as the rule of law prevails, the principle that the executive should be 
subject to law overrides considerations of a separation of powers" . 
124 Wade, above n 24, 16-21. 
125 Dorset Yacht, above n 10, 1067 per Lord Diplock. 
126 B Feldthusen "Failure to Confer Discretionary Public Benefits: The Case for Complete Negligence 
Immunity" [1997] TLR 17, 19. 
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The costs associated with proceedings are an empirical matter in relation to which 
Feldthusen adduces no evidence. Furthermore, judicial review proceedings have been 
heard by the courts for many years without great alarm about their expense. Finally, an 
increase in court costs resulting from negligence actions may be justified by a 
corresponding decrease in the violation of individuals' common law rights . 
4 Defensiveness 
The most frequently advanced argument for refusing to impose a duty of care on the 
government is the argument that a duty would cause public servants to act defensively. 
This argument can take three forms . 
One form of the argument from defensiveness was advanced by Lord Hoffmann in 
Stovin. His Lordship stated that imposing a duty of care on a county council to ensure 
that its roads are safe would, given its limited budget, "distort" its priorities, causing it to 
increase spending on road improvement and to reduce spending on education and social 
services.127 Such distortion interferes with Parliament's delegation to the decision-maker 
and the separation of powers, and there is force in this argument unless duties of care are 
also owed in respect of education and social services. However, the proposed policy 
immunity rule answers this objection as public servants will have no cause for concern or 
defensive behaviour unless their decisions are clearly erroneous. 
Secondly, it has been argued that imposing a duty of care in respect of the exercise of 
statutory powers which permit the conferral of benefits instead of authorising otherwise 
tortious conduct may cause public authorities to decide not to exercise such powers in an 
attempt to avoid liability. This argument is easily answered because public authorities 
have a public law duty properly to consider whether to exercise a power to confer a 
benefit. A decision never to exercise a statutory power based solely on the avoidance of 
liability for negligence in the exercise of the power is likely to be quashed by a court if 
judicial review is sought. It is submitted that precisely this form of the defensiveness 
127 Above n 52, 958 . See also Feldtlmsen, above n 126, 18-19, 30; Sopinka, above n 121, 124. 
27 
argument was raised in Anns and that Lord Wilberforce employed the very response just 
developed to refute it. 
128 
In its third form the defensiveness argument states that even if defensiveness in 
respect of policy decisions can be avoided, the imposition a duty of care will cause 
undesirable defensiveness in non-policy decisions. This will occur, for example, where 
building inspectors insist on five foot foundations where three foot foundations are 
adequate for fear of having overlooked the fact that five foot foundations are actually 
required. 129 This argument is often overstated. While imposing a duty may cause 
inefficiency, it may also reduce inefficiency by encouraging the taking of due care. 
Whether this third form of the argument justifies denying a duty of care should be 
considered at the policy balancing stage of the Anns and Caparo tests. 
5 The government does things which individuals cannot do 
It could be argued that the government must be treated differently from private 
individuals because only the government is able or permitted to do or to omit to do 
certain acts. For example, only the government may operate prisons. 
It is submitted that this argument should be rejected. Accepting it would commit one 
to the odd conclusion that the government would lose its immunity from negligence in 
relation to prisons if ever a statute were enacted which permitted private individuals to 
operate prisons. Clearly, any distinction between the rules of liability for the government 
and private individuals must clearly be based on differences between the policy 
128 Above n 35, 754-755 . This view is supported by the fact that his Lordship referred to the public law duty 
properly to consider whether a power should be exercised after swnmarising the defendant ' s argument as 
follows : "It is said ... that the local authority is w1der no duty to inspect, and this is used as the foundation 
for an argwnent ... that if it need not inspect at aU, it cannot be liable for negligent inspection : if it were to 
be held so liable, so it is said, councils would simply decide against inspection" . It is submitted that the 
words "no duty to inspect" refer to the absence of a public law duty on the defendant council in Anns, and 
not to the absence of a common law duty of care. If tllis is correct, then criticisms of Anns which assume 
that Lord Wilberforce argued that the existence of a public law duty properly to consider whether to inspect 
ipso facto resulted in a duty of care are misconceived: Heyman, above n 12, 19 per Mason J. 
129 This "overkill" argwnent was advanced by Lord Keith in Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd, above n 44, 
502. 
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considerations which bear on the imposition of duties of care on them and on the fact that 
only the government makes policy decisions. 
6 Pure omissions 
As is argued below, the distinction between positive acts and pure omissions has no 
bearing on the form of the policy immunity rule.
130 
B The form of the proposed policy immunity rule 
The policy immunity rule contended for is outlined in this part of the paper. It is 
based upon the rule adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in Just and Brown, but 
differs in significant ways. The elements of the proposed rule are justified to the extent 
that they have not been argued for above. 
J Choice 
In order to be able to invoke the policy immunity rule, the decision-maker must have 
a choice as to what to do in the exercise of a statutory power. 
2 Execution of policy decisions 
No liability can arise if a policy decision falling within the immunity rule is made and 
employees are instructed to implement it and they follow their instructions.
13 1 
However, when a policy decision is made and employees are instructed to do a 
certain act which they forget to do or do carelessly, the employees will not have made a 
policy decision and the government will not be able to invoke the policy immunity rule in 
respect of their negligence. 
Finally, the view taken by some courts that, once a policy decision has been made, no 
subsequent decision can be a policy decision is not adopted here.
132 Such a rule ignores 
130 Below pa.rt IVB3 . 
131 Dalehite, above n 107, 36. 
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the fact a policy maker who decides on a course of action will not necessarily consider 
every policy aspect of the task at hand before its implementation commences. Policy 
matters may require consideration by other personnel once implementation has begun. 
Thus, any decision involving policy which meets the requirements set out here should fall 
within the policy immunity rule. 
3 Policy was actually taken into account 
The government must actually have taken policy considerations into account in 
reaching a decision in order for it to fall within the policy immunity rule. Following 
Mason J in Heyman, policy decisions can be said to include those "dictated by financial , 
economic, social or political factors" as distinct from "administrative direction, expert or 
professional opinion [and] technical standards".
133 These categories will require 
clarification by the courts. A detailed discussion of the decisions which should be 
classified as policy is beyond the scope of this paper. It is, however, obvious that a 
decision as to whether limited government funds should be invested in defence or in 
hospitals should be regarded as a policy decision. The same can be said of social policy 
decisions regarding the appropriate level of taxation or whether to have open rather than 
closed borstals . 
One may wonder whether immunity is ever justified for decisions which do not 
involve policy. It should be noted that the question here is not whether a duty of care 
should be owed in respect of all government activity which does not involve policy 
decisions. Even if a decision does not fall within the policy immunity rule, the policy or 
justice and reasonableness stage of the Anns or Caparo test may nevertheless prevent a 
duty from arising. The question is thus simply whether where a decision is made pursuant 
to a statutory power the very fact that the decision is made by the government and that it 
is made under a statutory power rather than by a private individual not acting under a 
statutory power should suffice for immunity. 
132 Such a suggestion is made in Just, above n 15, 707, 709. For criticism sec MK Woodall "Private Law 
Liability of Public Authorities for Negligent Inspection and Regulation" [ 1992] 37 McGill LJ 83, 90 . 
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It is submitted that it should not. A public authority which, without basing its conduct 
on policy considerations, acts in such a manner that a private individual in its position 
would be liable in negligence should be held liable. Why, for example, should a minister 
who has an enormous budget but who directs that foundations of inadequate thickness be 
used for a building due to ignorance about building safety be treated differently from a 
private individual who acts in the same manner and causes harm? The only justification 
for differential treatment is policy. When policy is absent, there should be no differential 
treatment because it is not justified by the separation of powers or a lack of objective 
criteria with which to assess the decision's reasonableness. As was said by the dissent in 
Dalehite, "an increased sense of caution and responsibility even at [cabinet] height would 
be wholesome" .134 Furthermore, Mason J stated in Heyman that the courts are capable of 
assessing the reasonableness of government action where it is based on "administrative 
discretion, expert or professional opinion [or] technical standards" rather than policy. 
135 
Overlooking this fact is Dorset Yacht's primary fault. 
Curial support for requmng a public authority actually to have taken policy 
considerations into account can be found in X v Bedfordshire, where Lord Browne-
Wilkinson referred to "the relevant factors taken into account by the authority" m 
explaining his non-justiciability rule.
136 Feldthusen has also suggested such a 
· 137 requirement. 
4 No sub-categorisation of policy decisions 
In Just, Cory J distinguished between "high level" policy decisions, such as a 
decision to build a lighthouse, and those made at a "lower level", such as a decision about 
how to inspect aircraft parts. It was said that a decision falling within the latter sub-
category of policy decisions could attract liability unless "the government agency 
establishes that it was a reasonable decision in the light of the circumstances".
138 As 
133 Above 11 12, 469-470. 
134 Above 11 107, 58. 
135 Above 11 12, 469-470. 
136 Above 11 14, 737. 
137 Above 11 126, 32 
138 Above 11 15, 706-707. 
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Feldthusen correctly points out, drawing such distinctions is "a hopeless task" as there are 
no obvious criteria for distinguishing among various levels of policy.
139 
While Just 's reasonableness requirement was rejected in Brown, 
140 the difference 
between the results in Just and Brown, unless explained by an absence of evidence that 
policy was actually considered in Just, appears to expose another problematic attempt to 
distinguish among different levels of policy. In Just a highway authority's decision as to 
how frequently to inspect a slope above a highway for loose rocks was found not to have 
been a policy decision.
141 By contrast, a highway authority' s decision as to the frequency 
of shifts for removing black ice was held to have been a policy decision in Brown. 
142 
Such distinctions, which, in the words of Lord Hoffmann in Stovin, are "hardly visible to 
the naked eye",
143 must be rejected . As his Lordship pointed out, practically every 
decision, no matter how trivial , can affect a public body ' s budget.
144 It is therefore 
submitted that every decision in the making of which policy is considered should fall 
within the policy immunity rule. 
5 It must be appropriate for the decision-maker to take policy into account 
While a policy decision can be made at any level, there are some government 
employees of whose task is no part to make policy decisions although they may have the 
opportunity to take policy into account in making decisions which they are required to 
make. Scalia J suggested the requirement proposed here in Gaubert.
145 His Honour said 
of the dock workers in Dalehite that even if they had performed a careful analysis of the 
risks and benefits of storing explosive fertiliser in a certain manner, such a decision 
would not have fallen within s 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act because it was not 
their task to ponder such things. 
139 Above 11 126, 22 . 
140 Above 11 16, 16. 
141 Above 11 15, 709 . 
142 Above n 16, 16. 
143 Above n 52, 955-956. 
144 Above 11 52, 951. 
145 Above 11 107, 335. 
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It should be noted that this requirement does not reintroduce the uncertainty which 
rejecting the sub-categorisation of policy decisions was intended to avoid. Determining 
whether an employee' s work involves making policy decisions is quite different from 
distinguishing between high and low level policy decisions.
146 
6 Burden shift 
The burden of establishing that policy was taken into account in reaching a certain 
decision should rest on the government. 
147 Such a burden shift is justified by the obvious 
difficulty which a private plaintiff could face in determining what the government took 
into account in reaching a decision and by the fact that, as the government routinely 
keeps records of its decisions for other purposes, it would not be unduly onerous. 
Authority for such a burden shift may be drawn, by way of analogy, from Just, where 
Cory J stated that "a true policy decision may be made at a lower level provided that the 
government agency establishes that it was a reasonable decision".
148 
7 No absolute immunity 
It is submitted that policy decisions should not automatically be accorded immunity 
from negligence liability no matter how absurd they are. Only those which are not clearly 
erroneous should be immune.
149 
As was argued above, neither the absence of objective standards nor the separation of 
powers nor the need to avoid defensiveness mandates absolute immunity. Feldthusen, 
however, asserts that it is "simply incoherent" to stop short of absolute immunity because 
it is impossible to determine when a policy choice is negligent.
150 He argues that courts 
should not demand that every beneficial programme be funded until its "net costs" 
146 This is conceded by Feldthusen: above n 126, 22. 
147 S Todd The Law of Torts in New Zealand (led, Brooker' s, Wellington, 1991) 240. The autJ10r suggests 
tJiat the burden of proving tJ1at a decision fell within tJ1e "policy sphere" of the policy/operations rule 
should rest on the government. See also Fcldthusen, above n 126, 32. CompareAnns, above n 35, 755. 
148 Above n 15, 707. 
149 The absolute inununity conferred on non-justiciable decisions by Xv Bedfordshire has been criticised by 
CJ Hilson and WVH Rogers "X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council: Tort law and statutory functions 
- probably not end of the story" (1995) 3 TLJ LEXIS 16, 19. 
150 Above n 126, 30. 
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exceed its "net benefits" and that it is impossible for the courts to evaluate by any other 
means the reasonableness of the government's resource allocation decisions.
151 While the 
reasonableness of resource allocation decisions no doubt should not be assessed by means 
of a marginal cost/benefit analysis, there are other ways of making such an assessment. 
Surely, it is possible to describe a decision to close all hospitals and to invest all the 
money saved in ministerial limousines as clearly erroneous without a marginal 
cost/benefit analysis? 
It is therefore submitted that New Zealand should follow the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Brown in rejecting an absolute immunity rule, particularly as the English courts ' 
have adopted no definite position on this matter. While the Privy Council in Rowling v 
Takara Properties Ltd suggested an absolute immunity rule, it left the matter open.
152 
The House of Lords accepted absolute immunity in X v Bedfordshire, but in Stovin the 
majority rejected the policy/operations distinction while Lord Nicholls for the minority 
said that "an area of blanket immunity seems undesirable and unnecessary".
153 Finally, in 
Barrett their Lordships did not explain whether X v Bedfordshire's absolute immunity 
rule had been reinstated. 
8 The policy immunity rule should be integrated with the ordina,y principles of 
negligence 
It remains to explain how the policy immunity rule supplements the ordinary 
principles of negligence.
154 Various possibilities exist. The rule could, as was done by the 
Supreme Court of Washington in Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v The 
State of Washington, 
155 simply be read into the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 and other 
Acts which make government bodies liable in tort. Alternatively, the policy immunity 
151 Above n 126, 30 . Perhaps the first part of Feldthusen 's argument could be better expressed by saying 
that the government should not be required to fund a beneficial programme w1til its marginal benefit equals 
its marginal cost. 
152 Above n 44, 500-501. Their Lordships expressly stated that they found it unnecessary to decide whether 
a duty of care arose. 
153 Above n 52, 938. 
154 The requirements for liability being the existence of a duty of care, its breach by a failure to take 
reasonable care and damage caused by tJ1e breach. 
155 407 P2d 440 (1966). 
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rule could be seen as part of the defence of statutory authority. As a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the courts could presume that Parliament, when conferring a statutory 
power, intended to extinguish negligence actions only to the extent that they might result 
in liability for policy decisions which are not clearly erroneous. It has also been 
suggested that a policy immunity rule could alter the standard of care required of a public 
defendant. 156
 Finally, the policy immunity rule could be treated as a factor negativing the 
existence of a duty of care under the Anns and Caparo tests. 
Which of these approaches is adopted is unimportant. That based on the defence of 
statutory authority requires the smallest conceptual departure from Dorset Yacht, and 
should perhaps be preferred for that reason; while Lord Diplock modified the defence by 
requiring Wednesbury unreasonableness, the policy immunity rule could be introduced 
instead. 1
57 The necessary and sufficient conditions for liability are thus as follows : 
1. If the government has exercised a discretionary statutory power without considering 
policy, a duty can arise under the ordinary Caparo or Anns tests for imposing a duty. The 
defence of statutory authority is as in Geddis. 
2. If the government has made a policy decision, Geddis applies only if the decision does 
not fall within the policy immunity rule. If the decision does not fall within the policy 
immunity rule, a duty can arise under Caparo or Anns. The policy immunity rule applies 
if: 
a) A policy decision is not clearly erroneous; and 
b) A statute gives the decision-maker a choice as to what to do: and 
c) The decision-maker actually took policy matters (resource allocation, social 
policy and political considerations) into account; and 
d) The decision-maker proves that policy was actually taken into account; and 
e) It was appropriate for the decision-maker to take policy into account. 
3. The duty was breached. 
4. The breach caused dan1age. 
It should be noted that if a policy decision is found to be clearly erroneous, then, if a 
duty arises under Caparo, it should be presumed that that duty has been breached. It 
156 SH Bailey and MJ Bowman "The Policy/Operational Dichotomy - A Cuckoo in the Nest" [1986] CLJ 
430, 435; S Todd (ed) The Law oJTorts in New Zealand (2ed, Brooker's, Wellington, 1997), 355-357. 
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would be odd to say that a decision was clearly erroneous but that it was made with 
reasonable care. Furthermore, the policy immunity rule cannot be a "touchstone of 
liability". While categorisation of a decision as a policy decision precludes liability in the 
absence of clear erroneousness, categorisation of a decision as not involving policy does 
not suffice for liability. 
158 
C Is the policy immunity rule consistent with the Crown Proceedings Act 1950? 
Section 6(1) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 - the provision which must 
generally be relied on in tort actions against the Crown - provides as follows: 
159 
Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other Act, the Crown shall be subject to 
all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it 
would be subject---
(a) In respect of torts committed by its servants or agents .. . 
Whether the language of this prov1s1on permits the courts to create special rules 
governing the liability of the Crown in negligence which do not apply to individuals is 
unclear. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States in Dalehite noted that the New 
Zealand legislature had never enacted a provision equivalent to s 2680(a) of the Federal 
Torts Claims Act and had thus " left open to grave doubt how far, if at all , it . .. intended 
.. . to give the subject rights of action which in the result would seriously interfere with 
the ordinary administrative work of the government" .
160 
Any questions in this regard raised by the provision were, however, ignored by the 
Privy Council in approving the policy/operations distinction as the law of New Zealand 
in Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd. 
161 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Washington in 
157 Above n 10, 1066-1068. 
158 Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd, above n 44, 501. 
159 It should be noted that as a consequence of this provision the Crown can be liable in ton only where its 
servants or agents commit a tort and vicarious liability applies. Direct tortious liability without the 
commission of a tort by an agent or servant is impossible. Furthennore, the provision creates problems for 
those who argue that the Crown can owe a duty of care in respect of pure omissions because the policy 
reasons for refusing to impose such a duty on private individuals do not apply to the Crown. 
160 Above n 107, 32-33 per Reed J, citing Enever v The King (1906) 3 Com LR 969, 988. 
161 Above n 44, 501. 
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the Evangelical United Brethren Church case
162 simply read a rule similar to that 
contained in s 2680(a) into the statute which waived sovereign immunity for the State of 
Washington although the statute stated that immunity had been waived even in respect of 
acts done by the state in its "governmental . . . or proprietary capacity" . Faced with an 
argument against the policy immunity rule based on s 6(1)(a), the courts would probably 
reject it on the basis that Parliament did not turned its mind to the need for such a rule 
and that the consequences of its rejection would be unacceptable. 
IV THE DEFENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The fate of Dorset Yacht 's rule is considered here. Dorset Yacht restricted Geddis' 
rule that negligence can never be implicitly authorised by a statute to non-discretionary 
conduct under statutory powers. It stated that where decision-makers have a choice as to 
how to implement Parliament's aims in conferring a statutory power their decisions, even 
if negligent, cannot attract liability unless they are unreasonable in the Wednesbwy sense. 
Essentially, it is argued that Dorset Yacht's rule should be rejected for to reasons. 
First, it does not achieve its objective and causes injustice. Secondly, it is redundant if the 
policy immunity rule is accepted. 
A Invalidity is not the test of fault and should not be the test of liability 
Todd has complained that "[i]t is hard to understand why the ultra vires doctrine has 
been introduced . . . Invalidity is not the test of fault and should not be the test of 
liability". 163 This criticism is misconceived. It appears incorrectly to assume that 
irrationality is a sufficient condition for liability under Dorset Yacht's rule . Their 
Lordships were, however, quite clear in stating that this is not so. They stated that if an 
act or omission is intra vires it is presumed to be within the margin of error which 
Parliament intended to permit when conferring a statutory power and that the defence of 
statutory authority thus prevents liability in negligence for intra vires conduct. By 
contrast, when an administrative decision is ultra vires, the defence of statutory authority 
162 Above n 155. 
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cannot apply. However, this does not suffice for liability as their Lordships stat
ed that 
liability further required the breach of a duty of care under ordinary commo
n law 
principles.
164 Dorset Yacht thus cannot be criticised for making proof of ultra vires 
conduct the test of liability. 
B Dorset Yacht's justifications for restricting Geddis are unpersuasive 
Their Lordships in Dorset Yacht advanced several arguments to justify their 
restriction of Geddis. It is respectfully submitted that these arguments are unpersuasive
. 
l The need for a margin of permissible error for policy decisions 
The House of Lords in Dorset Yacht explained in detail its reasons for departing from 
Geddis. Lord Reid said in respect of an open borstal policy that: 
165 
the responsible authorities must weigh on the one hand the public interest of
 
protecting neighbours and their property from the depredations of escaping trainees
 and 
on the other hand the public interest of promoting rehabilitation. Obviously there is m
uch 
room here for differences of opinion and errors of judgment .. . There could onl
y be 
liability if the person entrusted with discretion reached a conclusion so unreasonable a
s 
. .. to show a failure to do his duty. 
This is simply the argument from the absence of objective standards discus
sed 
above. 166 Lord Dip lock gave the same justification, saying that in balancin
g the 
imperatives of rehabilitation and protection of the public "there [ was] no criter
ion by 
which a court can assess where the balance lies between the weight to be given 
to one 
interest and that to be given to another" .
167 
163 Above n 147, 231, citing KC Davis A dministrative Lmv Treatise (KC Davis Publishi
ng Co, San Diego, 
1958) 487. 
164 Above n 10, 1026-1033 per Lord Reid, 1066-1070 per Lord Diplock. 
165 Above n 10, 1031. 
166 Above part IIIA 1. 
167 Above n 10, 1067. 
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(a) Redundancy 
In Xv Bedfordshire, Lord Browne-Wilkinson retained Dorset Yacht 's rule as a 
precondition to liability but added a separate rule of absolute immunity for non-
justiciable decisions.
168 Explaining the purpose of the non-justiciability rule, his Lordship 
said :169 
Since what are under consideration are discretionary powers conferred on public 
bodies for public purposes the relevant factors will often include policy matters, for 
example social policy, the allocation of finite financial resources between different calls 
made upon them or (as in Dorset Yacht) the balance between pursuing desirable social 
aims as against the risk to the public inherent in so doing. It is established that the courts 
cannot enter upon the assessment of such "policy" matters. 
Strikingly, the rationale for the non-justiciability rule is identical to that for Dorset 
Yacht 's rule. There thus exist two rules with the same function but which differ in the 
manner in which they seek to achieve it. The non-justiciability rule directly identifies 
decisions which involve policy and which the courts should not review; Dorset Yacht 's 
rule immunises all decisions involving choice as to how a statutory aim is achieved 
because they may involve the consideration of policy. It is respectfully submitted that this 
redundancy should be remedied by abandoning Dorset Yacht 's rule. The non-
justiciability rule - of which the policy immunity rule is a reformulation 
170 
- is better 
suited to the purpose which both rules serve for three reasons. 
(b) Dorset Yacht 's rule confers immunity where it is inappropriate 
Dorset Yacht 's rule confers limited immunity on discretionary decisions made under 
statutory powers. Lord Diplock defined discretion as the "right to determine the particular 
means within the limits laid down by the statute by which its purpose can best be 
fulfilled" .17 1 Clearly this extends the immunity beyond the policy decisions to which it is 
intended to apply. If a statutory power exists as to how to inspect buildings' foundations, 
168 Above n 14, 737-738. 
169 Above n 14, 737. 
170 Above part III. 
171 Above n 10, 1067. 
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a decision about the type of tape measure to use falls within the definition of discretion 
although it may have been made without any thought being given to social policy or 
resource allocation. As has been argued above, immunity in such cases is undesirable. 
172 
In X v Bedfordshire a discretionary decision was redefined as a decision made "in 
exercising a statutory [power] as to whether or not to do an act" and was contrasted with 
"[when] having decided to do [an] act, ... the manner in which you do it. "
173 On this 
definition, instances of discretionary decisions which do not require the consideration of 
social policy or resource allocation are again easily imagined. For example, a minister 
whom a statute empowers to build a building may without considering policy matters 
direct that inadequate foundations be constructed and thus create a danger to the public. 
( c) Dorset Yacht 's rule denies immunity when it is needed 
Given Xv Bedfordshire 's definition of discretion, it easy to imagine non-justiciable 
policy considerations being relevant to a decision which does not qualify as discretionary. 
Resource allocation decisions must clearly be made by a school ' s principal in running a 
school, yet Lord Browne-Wilkinson cited as an example of a non-discretionary act "the 
actual running of a school pursuant to the statutory duties". Such decisions need not be 
irrational in order to lose the protection of the defence of statutory authority because they 
are not discretionary. Furthermore, they are afforded no protection by Xv Bedfordshire 's 
non-justiciability rule as this only functions to prevent a discretionary decision from 
being found to be irrational. 
174 It thus appears that non-discretionary policy decisions 
receive no immunity under Xv Bedfordshire. Why this should be so is difficult to fathom . 
Adopting Dorset Yacht's definition of discretion would avoid this problem. However, 
it too would deny immunity where it is needed. As discussed above, 
175 the heads of 
judicial review overlap - a decision can be irrational because an irrelevant consideration 
172 Above part IIIB3 . See also KM Hogg "The Liability of a Public AuU10rity for the Failure to Carry Out a 
Careful Exercise of its Statutory Powers: The Significance of the High Court' s Decision in Sutherland 
Shire Council v Heyman" (1991) 17 Mon ULR 285, 293. 
173 Above n 14, 735 . 
174 Above n 14, 738. 
175 Above part IllAl. 
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has been taken into account. Thus, Dorset Yacht's rule may deny immunity because an 
irrelevant consideration has been taken into account, although the fact that it has been 
taken into account does not assist a court in assessing the reasonableness of a policy 
decision. 
( d) Dorset Yacht 's definition of discretion is uncertain 
Lord Diplock in Dorset Yacht defined discretionary decisions as those involving the 
"right to determine the particular means within the limits laid down by the statute by 
which its purpose can best be fulfilled" .
176 Essentially, discretion exists where there is a 
choice as to how and whether some act which relates to the purpose for which a statutory 
power is conferred is to be done. In Gaubert, the United States Supreme Court adopted a 
similar definition for the term discretionary as used in s 2680(a) of the Federal Torts 
Claims Act. Immunity exists whenever an act is "based on the purposes that the 
regulatory regime [ie the legislation conferring the power under which defendant acts] 
seeks to accomplish".
177 
The problem is that determining which acts are sufficiently closely related to the 
purpose for which the power is conferred is a difficult task. The Court in Gaubert found 
that the FHLBB, having taken control of the Independent American Savings Association 
(IASA), was furthering the Home Owners ' Loans Act's policy of securing the banking 
system in taking "day-to-day" decisions in running the IASA. Its conduct therefore fell 
within the s 2680(a) immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
178 However, the Court 
said that driving a car while furthering the Act ' s aims was "obviously" not sufficiently 
connected with the policy of the Act.
179 With respect, this is far from obvious, especially 
as day-to-day commercial decisions are sufficiently connected with the Act ' s purpose. 
Thus, Dorset Yacht's and Gaubert 's tests probably do little to counter the threat of 
defensive conduct by government agencies because civil servants cannot predict when 
their acts will attract immunity. Unfortunately for Dorset Yacht's rule, the only 
176 Above n 10, 1067. 
177 Above n 112, 315. 
178 Above n 112, 332. 
179 Above n 112, 315. 
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alternative definition of discretion is X v Bedfordshire's, which creates problems of
 its 
own. 
2 Geddis has been rejected in other cases 
According to Lord Diplock, "over the past century the public law concept of 
ultra 
vires has replaced the civil law concept of negligence as the test of legality" .
180 However, 
his Lordship cited no authority in support of this proposition. Furthermore, in 
1945 in 
Fisher v Ruislip-Northwood Urban District Council Lord Greene MR, after a w
ide 
survey of decisions on the careless exercise of statutory powers, concluded tha
t Geddis 
was still correct.
181 
3 Geddis cannot apply to pure omissions cases 
Lord Dip lock appeared to argue that Geddis' rule could determine when the defence 
of statutory authority is exceeded in respect of statutory powers which a
uthorise 
otherwise tortious conduct but not in respect of powers which permit conduct w
hich is 
not tortious - powers which permit the conferral of a benefit.
182 His Lordship did not 
explain why this should be so, and it is respectfully submitted that the su
ggested 
distinction is unsustainable. Whether the government commits a tort by actively 
harming 
individuals or by failing to assist them, it should be liable where it breaches a c
ommon 
law duty of care unless a policy decision is involved. Concerns about the desira
bility of 
governmental liability for pure omissions should be addressed when deciding w
hether a 
duty arises under the Caparo and Anns tests. 
Even if Lord Diplock ' s attempt restrictively to distinguish Geddis in respect of 
powers to do acts which are tortious unless authorised could be justified, it would
 provide 
no support for his Lordship's conclusion that "the public law concept of ultra v
ires has 
replaced the civil law concept of negligence as the test of legality", 
183 which suggests that 
Geddis has been universally displaced . 
180 Above 11 10, 1067. 
181 [1945] 1 KB 584, 592-595. 
182 Above 11 10, 1066-1067. 
183 Above 11 10, 1067. 
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C Congruence between the public law test of ultra vires and the scope of the 
defence of statutory authority is unnecessary 
Once it is accepted that irrationality is not needed to create a zone of immunity for 
policy decisions and that such a zone is better provided by the policy immunity rule, there 
is no reason to require irrationality instead of merely common law negligence to defeat 
the defence of statutory authority. 
Modern administrative law evolved in response to the relatively recent adoption by 
Parliament of the practice of conferring upon the executive discretionary statutory powers 
while placing few restrictions on their use. 
184 It is directed at preventing the arbitrary and 
unfair use of such powers in respect of private individuals. It is concerned principally 
with promoting the observance of fair procedures in government decision-making, and 
decisions can be quashed irrespective of whether they breach an applicant's common law 
rights .185 For instance, where an applicant's common law rights are in no way affected by 
the exercise a statutory power to grant someone else a fishing licence, the applicant, 
provided that his or her interests are in some way affected, may have the decision 
quashed if the decision-maker failed observe the principles of natural justice. 
By contrast, once relieved of the role of providing a zone of permissible policy error, 
the defence of statutory authority functions solely to determine the extent to which 
individuals ' common law rights are extinguished by the conferral of a statutory power to 
do or to omit to do a certain act. Where Parliament does not expressly specify the extent 
to which it wishes to extinguish common law rights, the scope of the defence must be a 
matter of presumed legislative intent. 
Given the presumption against the extinguishment of common law rights except by 
express language or necessary implication, 
186 it is reasonable to accept that Parliament in 
conferring a statutory power should be presumed to have intended to authorise the 
184 Wade, above n 24, 16-21 ; Joseph, above 11 122, 656-657. 
185 Wade, above n 24, 3-7; Hogg, above 11 127, 292. 
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infringement of common law rights only to the minimum extent necessary. Thus, where 
Parliament has authorised the doing of a certain act without expressly extinguishing 
common law rights, it should be presumed to have intended to extinguish them only to 
the extent that the commission of a tort is the inevitable consequence of doing what 
Parliament has authorised. This is Geddis' rule - negligence is never authorised because 
negligence is never inevitable. 187 
The heads of judicial review do not necessarily reveal anything about when harm is 
the inevitable consequence of doing what Parliament has authorised. For example, the 
taking into account of irrelevant considerations in the making of a decision to build a 
road sheds no light whatsoever on what the inevitable consequences of building a road 
are. The heads of judicial review are therefore irrelevant to the defence of statutory 
authority, and any superficial attraction of congruence between the heads of judicial 
review and the scope of the defence of statutory authority evaporates. 
V EFFECT ON DECIDED CASES 
Some of the decisions which are reviewed in part II would not be greatly affected by 
the adoption of the policy immunity rule and the absence of Dorset Yacht 's rule. This is 
because they involved strike out applications without a finding of irrationality having 
been made. However, the significance of the policy immunity rule is not diminished . Its 
adoption would have a significant effect when cases actually go to trial and on potential 
plaintiffs when considering whether to sue. 
As discussed above, the effect of Dorset Yacht 's rule in Barrett is particularly 
unfortunate. If Barrett has failed to change the law in England, then if the plaintiff's 
injuries cannot be traced to non-discretionary acts by the social workers he will fail 
unless the social workers ' conduct meets the notoriously high Wednesbury threshold . By 
contrast, the plaintiff would probably succeed if the policy immunity rule were adopted. 
He would lose only if no duty arose under Caparo or if the council could prove that the 
186 Morris v Beardmore f 1981] AC 446, 463 per Lord Scarman; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 
435-436. 
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social workers made resource allocation or social policy decisions which were not clearly 
erroneous. 
It is unclear whether the result in Brown would change if the policy immunity rule 
were applied . The decision not to switch from the summer road inspection schedule to the 
winter schedule may have involved financial considerations. Whether such evidence was 
provided by the government of British Columbia is unclear from the report of the case. If 
evidence that policy had actually been considered was presented, the case would fall 
within the policy immunity rule. The plaintiff would then have to establish that it was 
morally unacceptable and therefore clearly erroneous to permit the public to use the road 
without eliminating the risk posed by the falling rocks. This argument might succeed. If 
policy was not actually considered, the immunity rule would not apply, and, given the 
prime facie duty which arose in Just, liability would be likely. 
Finally, Gaubert would have been decided differently had it arisen for decision under 
the policy immunity rule. White J for the majority found that although no social or 
economic policy had been considered by the FHLBB, the s 2680(a) immunity applied 
because decisions about the day-to-day operation of the IASA were made by the FHLBB 
in furtherance of the Home Owners ' Loan Act's policy of ensuring the stability of the 
financial system. Under the policy immunity rule, such decisions would not attract 
immunity because they do not fall within the class of policy decisions. The plaintiff 
would have succeeded if the FHLBB was negligent. 
VI CONCLUSION 
It appears clear that the law of negligence cannot, without some modification, provide 
satisfactory rules for holding the government liable for the careless exercise of its 
statutory powers. The reason, essentially, is that the government, unlike individuals, must 
make policy decisions in the public interest. Constitutionally it is inappropriate for the 
courts to create duties of care which interfere with policy decisions, and assessing 
whether a policy decision is unreasonable presents practical difficulties . These 
187 Above part IIA. 
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considerations need not, however, drive the courts to immunise all discretionary 
decisions or to confer absolute immunity on policy decisions. 
A modified version of the Canadian Supreme Court's rule in Just and Brown suffices 
to address the difficulties which arise in this area of the law. Immunity should be 
conferred only where certain defined types of policy consideration are actually taken into 
account and only where the impugned decision is not clearly erroneous. Only in this 
manner can the courts avoid extending immunity too far and a repetition of Barrett. 
What must be eschewed is the English courts ' use, beginning in Dorset Yacht, of 
judicial review principles to immunise all discretionary decisions on the basis that the 
courts should not usurp the executive's decision-making powers. As Mason J said in 
Heyman, "[a]lthough such injunctions have compelling force in their application to 
policy-making decisions, their cogency is less obvious when applied to other 
discretionary matters" .188 Indeed, Dorset Yacht extends immunity both too far and not far 
enough. Xv Bedfordshire 's conflation of Dorset Yacht's rule with Mason J's rule m 
Heyman only compounds the problem by conferring absolute immunity. 
It is thus submitted that the New Zealand courts should reject Dorset Yacht's rule . 
While Barrett may foreshadow the House of Lords' abandonment of Dorset Yacht, the 
Court of Appeal, if it wishes to avoid having Xv Bedfordshire 's rule imposed on New 
Zealand, should not remain silent. No Privy Council authorities oblige New Zealand to 
follow Dorset Yacht, and forceful reasons against Dorset Yacht 's rule can and should be 
articulated . 
188 Above n 12, 468. 
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